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Akira Saito 
Preamble 
Among many noteworthy terms in Buddhism, prapañca (Pāli: papañca) is no doubt one 
of the most important keywords which requires a detailed examination in the contexts of 
its usage. In Nāgārjuna’s works such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) and others, 
prapañca and its derivatives are also crucial in understanding the author’s discussion of 
emptiness (śūnyatā) mostly found in the context of how to remove defilements (kleśa).  
According to its usage in the MMK, early Yogācāra treatises such as the 
Yogācārabhūmi, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu’s works, and the treatises by Bhāviveka and 
later Mādhyamikas, prapañca is closely related to human usage of terms and concepts 
which themselves are further rooted in mental, analytical, discursive, and proliferating 
activities.1 The word prapañca, therefore, is mostly used to refer to (1) the mental 
activity of “conceptualization”, to (2) the objects of mental activity, i.e., “conceptualized 
objects” or “conceptualized world”, or to (3) the instruments of mental activity, i.e., 
“concepts” or “terms”.   
   It also is important to note that while there is a slight difference between 
Nāgārjuna’s and early Yogācāras’ understandings of both prapañca and vikalpa,2 both 
Nāgārjuna and the early Yogācāras regarded prapañca as the root cause of defilements 
(kleśa). In contrast, they understood the quiescence of prapañca to be one of the 
characteristics of nirvāṇa, which they equated with tattva “[identical] reality” or tathatā 
“suchness”.  
   With this background information in mind, this paper will focus on Nāgārjuna’s 
usage of prapañca in the MMK, with special consideration to his commentators’ 
understandings of terms containing prapañca and its derivatives, such as prapañcayati 
and prapañcita.   
Before turning to Nāgārjuna’s usage of prapañca in the MMK, it may interest us to 
refer to both traditional translations and several modern renderings adopted by 
contemporary scholars as follows:   
Traditional Tibetan mostly renders it into spros pa (Mahāvyutpatti 174, etc., 
* This article was read at the 4th International Workshop on Madhyamaka Studies held at the ICPBS,
Tokyo from Dec. 1 to 2, 2018. Thanks are due to F. Deleanu who kindly took the trouble to correct
my English. However, any errors remain my responsibility.
1 For the etymological interpretation of prapañcayati as a denominative verb from pra-pañca “fünf/
five,” see Mayrhofer 1963: 187.
2 For the subjective and objective meanings of prapañca as used in the early Yogācāra works, see
Schmithausen 2007: 509-514 (n. 1405). For an important usage of prapañca in relation to vikalpa in
the Bodhisattvabhūmi, see Appendix.





aprapañca = spros pa med pa), i.e., pf. of spro ba “to spread, to disperse, etc.” On the 
other hand, Chinese translations use 戯論 [frivolous talk or discussion]3, occasionally
虚偽 [false] (Laṅkāvatārasūtra, tr. by *Guṇabhadra, *Śikṣānanda, and others) and妄想 
[delusion], etc.   
  Modern translations include “les idées discursives” (de Jong 1949: 10-11, 29-30), 
“le monde différencié” (May 1959: 175-176 (n. 562) ), “discursive development” 
(Seyfort-Ruegg 1981: 64), “Vielfalt” (Erb 1997: 122-123 (n. 198)), “prolific conceptu- 
alization” (Ñāṇananda 1971: 21), “the object of prolific conceptualization/ the subjec- 
tive act of prolific conceptualization” (Schmithausen 2007: 510), “hypostatization” 
(Siderits and Katsura 2013: 197-198, 202-203), “manifoldness” (MacDonald 2015: 42), 
“kotoba no kyokōことばの虚構 [fiction of words]” (Kajiyama 1978: 163), “gengoteki 
tagensei言語的多元性 [verbal plurality]” (Kajiyama 1980: 140), “kyokōteki gengo虚
構的言語 [fictional words]” (Ejima: 1980: 21), etc.  
   Incidentally, Nyāyakośa explains prapañca as “(1) vistāraḥ [spreading or expansion], 
(2) vaiparītyam [contrariety or reverse], (3) pratāraṇam [deceiving or cheating], (4) 
saṃsāraḥ [transmigration, the world, worldly illusion].” (Jhalakīkar 1928: 550)     
 
1. Usage of prapañca in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
 
Let us, first, look at all the usages of prapañca and its derivatives found in Nāgārjuna’s 
MMK. There are ten occurrences found in the following six verses: 
  
Intro.    anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam/ 
anekārtham anānātham anāgamam anirgamam// 
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam/ 
deśayām āsa saṃbuddhaṃ taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam// 
    “The Fully Awakened One who taught the dependent-arising, the calming of 
conceptualization, blissful, [qualified by] non-cessation, non-arising, 
non-annihilation, non-eternity, non-one-thing, non-various-things, non- 
coming, non-going, I pay homage to him as the best of teachers.” 
  
XI.6     yatra na prabhavanty ete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ/ 
         prapañcayanti tāṃ jātiṃ taj jarāmaraṇaṃ ca kim// 
    “Where there cannot be the order of anteriority, posteriority, and simultaneity,  
how do they conceptualize: ‘This is birth and that is old age and death?’”  
          
XVIII.5  karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ/ 
te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate// 
“Liberation is [attained] from the destruction of actions and defilements. 
                                                   
3 Cf. Monier-Williams, Skt.-Eng. Dic., “(in dram.) ludicrous dialogue, Sāh(itya-darpaṇa).” 
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Actions and defilements [arise] from conception. These [conceptions arise] 
from conceptualization. But conceptualization is extinguished in 
emptiness.” 
 
XVIII.9  aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam/ 
nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam// 
“Not dependent on anything other than itself, quiescent, not conceptualized in 
[various] terms, beyond conception, undifferentiated, these are the 
characteristics of reality.” 
 
XXII.15  prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam/ 
     te prapañcahatāḥ sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam//  
     “Those who conceptualize the Buddha, who is beyond conceptualization 
and imperishable, they all, suffering from conceptualization, fail to see the 
Tathāgata.”  
     
XXV.24  sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ/ 
         na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ// 
     “[The dependent-arising in its aspect of Nirvāṇa, i.e., nivṛtti] is the calming of 
all perceptions, the calming of conceptualization, and blissful. No dharma 
[in the sense of “teaching”] whatsoever was taught by the Buddha to anyone, 
anywhere.     
     
2. Commentators’ Understandings of prapañca 
  
Next, let us turn to commentators’ understanding of some of the above usages. In the 
following, I will refer to the explanations given in the Akutobhayā, Buddhapālita’s 
commentary, Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa, and Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā. First, let us 
see how these four commentaries understand MMK XVIII.5c.  
  
2-1:  ad MMK XVIII.5c (Tib. de dag spros las spros pa ni// = te prapañcāt 
[prapañcas tu]) 
 
Akutobhayā (P Tsa 82a1-2; D Tsa 70a4-5): rnam par rtog pa de dag ni spros pa 
las ’byung ste/ tha snyad kyi bden pa la mngon par zhen pa’i mtshan nyid kyi spros 
pa las ’byung ba’i phyir ro//  
“These conceptions arise from conceptualization, because they arise from 
conceptualization characterized by adherence to the truth of verbal habits 
(*vyavahāra-satya).” 
 





pa de dag ni spros pa las byung ba yin te ’jig rten pa’i spros pa las byung ngo// ’jig 
rten pa’i rnyed pa dang ma rnyed pa la sogs pa’i chos rnams la ’di bden no snyam 
du mngon par zhen pa’i blo can dag de dang de la rnam par rtog par byed pas de’i 
phyir rnam par rtog pa dag ni spros pa las byung ngo//  
“Now, these wrong conceptions arise from conceptualization, i.e., they arise from 
conceptualizations [formed by the ordinary people] of the world. Those whose minds 
adhere to [the idea] that ‘this is true’ with reference to the values (*dharma) such as 
worldly profit and loss (*lābhālābha), etc., they form conception on this [profit] and 
that [loss]. Therefore, [these] conceptions arise from conceptualization.” 
 
Prajñāpradīpa (P Tsha 231a1-2; D Tsha 185a6-7): las dang nyon mongs pa’i rgyu rnam 
par rtog pa gang yin pa de dag ni spros pa las byung bas de dag spros las zhes bya 
ba gsungs te/ tha snyad kyi bden pa la mngon par zhen pa’i mtshan nyid kyi spros 
pa las ’byung ngo// 
“Because these conceptions which cause actions and defilements arise from 
conceptualization, [Nāgārjuna] stated that ‘these arise from conceptualization.’ They 
arise from conceptualization characterized by adherence to the truth of verbal habits 
(*vyavahāra-satya). 
 
Prasannapadā (LVP, 350.13-15): te ca vikalpā anādimat-saṃsārābhyastāj jñāna- 
jñeya-vācya-vācaka-kartṛ-karma-karaṇa-kriyā-ghaṭa-paṭa-mukuṭa-ratha-rūpa- 
vedanā-strī-puruṣa-lābhālābha-sukha-duḥkha-yaśo-’yaśo-nindā-praśaṃsādi- 
lakṣaṇād vicitrāt prapañcād upajāyante/  
“These conceptions originate from conceptualization repeated in the beginningless 
transmigration, which has a variety of characteristics such as knowledge and the 
object of knowledge, a word and its meaning, an agents, the object of action, the 
means of action, and action, pot and cloth, crown and chariot, matter and sensation, 
female and male, profit and loss, pleasure and suffering, honor and dishonor, blame 
and praise, etc.” 
 
   Secondly, let us look at MMK XVIII.9b. 
   
2-2:  ad MMK XVIII.9b (Tib. spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa/ = prapañcair 
aprapañcitam) 
 
Akutobhayā (P Tsa 83b7; D Tsa 72a1): spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa zhes bya ba ni 
mngon par brjod pa’i mtshan nyid kyi spros pa nye bar zhi ba’i phyir ro// 
  “[Nāgārjuna] spoke of [the characteristic:] ‘not conceptualized in [various] terms’, 
because, [in the reality (tattva)], conceptualization characterized by verbal 
expressions (*abhilāpa) is calmed.”   
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Buddhapālita (P Tsa 277a8-b1; D Tsha 245a7-b1): spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa zhes 
bya ba ni ’jig rten gyi chos rnams dang bral ba zhes bya ba’i tshig go// 
“‘Not conceptualized in [various] terms’ means that [the reality] is freed from worldly 
values (*lokadharma).”  
 
Prajñāpradīpa (P Tsha 237b2-3; D Tsha 190a4): spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa zhes 
bya ba ni mngon par brjod pa’i mtshan nyid kyi spros pa nye bar zhi ba’i phyir ro// 
(=Akutobhayā) 
“[Nāgārjuna] spoke of [the characteristic:] ‘not conceptualized in [various] terms’, 
because, [in the reality (tattva)], conceptualization characterized by verbal 
expressions (*abhilāpa) is calmed.” 
 
Prasannapadā (LVP, 373.9-10): ata eva tat prapañcair aprapañcitam/ prapañco hi vāk 
prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā (/) prapañcair aprapañcitaṃ vāgbhir avyāhṛtam ity 
arthaḥ//  
“Therefore, this [reality (tattva)] is ‘not conceptualized in [various] terms’, because 
‘term’ means a word since it conceptualizes [various] objects. Thus, ‘not 
conceptualized in [various] terms’ means that [the reality] is not spoken of by 
words.”  
 
   Thirdly, the glosses on MMK XVIII.5 are as follows:  
 
2-3:  ad MMK XXII.15 (Tib. gang dag sangs rgyas spros ’das shing// zad pa med la 
spros byed pa// spros pas nyams pa de kun gyis// de bzhin gshegs pa mthong 
mi ’gyur// = prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam/ te prapañcahatāḥ 
sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam//) 
 
Akutobhayā (P Tsa 98a8-b3, D Tsa 85a3-5): gang dag sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das spros 
las ’das shing zad pa med pa la/ yod pa dang med pa dang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa 
dang gzugs kyi sku dang chos kyi sku dang gsung rab kyi sku dang/ mtshan nyid 
dang mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang rgyu dang ’das bu dang blo dang rtogs par bya ba 
dang/ stong pa dang mi stong pa la sogs pa’i spros pa dag gis spros par byed pa 
dang/ rtog par byed pa dang rlom sems su byed pa dang spros pas blo gros kyi mig 
nyams pa de dag thams cad kyis (=D; kyi P) dmus long gis nyi ma bzhin du/ de bzhin 
gshegs pa spros pa las ’das shing zad pa med pa chos kyi sku las (=PD; read la) 
mthong bar mi ’gyur ro// 
 “Their eyes of intellect suffering from conceptualization, those who conceptualize, 
conceive, and think of the Buddha or the Glorious One - who is beyond 
conceptualization and imperishable - in [various] terms such as existence and 
non-existence, permanence and impermanence, material body, dharma-body, and 





cause and effect, intellect and the object of intellect, emptiness and non-emptiness, 
etc., they all fail to see the Tathāgata who is beyond conceptualization, 
imperishableness and dharma-body, just as a blind person from birth [does not see] 
sunshine.”  
  
Buddhapālita (P Tsa 301a1-3; D tsa 266a 4-5): de’i phyir de ltar gang dag sangs 
rgyas bcom ldan ’das ’jig rten pa’i spros pa thams cad las yang dag par ’das shing 
zad pa med pa la/ yod pa dang med pa dang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa’i 
spros pa rnams kyis spros par byed pa de dag thams cad ni spros pa de dag gis ye 
shes kyi mig nyams pas dmus long gis (=D; gi P) nyi ma bzhin du/ de bzhin gshegs 
pa mthong bar mi ’gyur te/ 
  “Therefore, their eyes of intellect suffering from those conceptualizations, those who 
thus conceptualize the Buddha or the Glorious One - who is beyond 
conceptualization and imperishable - in [various] terms such as existence and 
non-existence, permanence and impermanence, etc., they all fail to see the Tathāgata 
just as a blind person from birth [does not see] sun-shine.”  
 
Prajñāpradīpa and Prasannapadā om.   
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
At the beginning of this paper, I mentioned the three possible meanings as used by 
Nāgārjuna in his MMK as follows: “The word prapañca, therefore, is mostly used to 
refer to (1) the mental activity of ‘conceptualization’, to (2) the objects of mental 
activity, i.e., ‘conceptualized objects’ or ‘conceptualized world’, or to (3) the 
instruments of mental activity, i.e., ‘concepts’ or ‘terms’.” 
   Regarding the “concepts” or “terms”, there appear different contexts in which 
prapañca and its derivatives are used. One of those contexts may be called a “verbal 
context” related to an agent, the object of action, the means of action, and action 
(kartṛ-karma-karaṇa-kriyā, see under 2-1, PSP ad MMK XVIII.5c). In contrast, some 
others may be called “nominal contexts” expressed typically by “pot” and “cloth” 
(ghaṭa-paṭa), “crown” and “chariot” (mukuṭa-ratha) and so on (loc. cit.). 
Some of these “concepts” or “terms” relate to epistemological factors, i.e., 
knowledge and the objects of knowledge (jñāna-jñeya), and others to semantic ones, i.e., 
words and their meanings (vācya-vācaka) (loc. cit.). 
Some refer to Buddhist traditional categories such as matter and sensation 
(rūpa-vedanā) (loc. cit.), material body, dharma-body, and teaching body (*pravacana- 
kāya) (gzugs kyi sku dang chos kyi sku dang gsung rab kyi sku, see under 2-3, ABh ad 
MMK XXII.15), and others to worldly categories such as female and male, profit and 
loss, pleasure and suffering, honor and dishonor, blame and praise 
(strī-puruṣa-lābhālābha-sukha-duḥkha-yaśo-’yaśo-nindā-praśaṃsa, see under 2-1, PSP 
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ad MMK XVIII.5c). 
Some of them are contradictory concepts such as existence and non-existence, 
permanence and impermanence (yod pa dang med pa dang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa, see 
under 2-3, ABh and BP ad MMK XXII.15), etc., and others are relative such as cause 
and effect (rgyu dang ’das bu, see under 2-3, ABh ad MMK XXII.15), etc.    
   Therefore, taking into consideration all the usages of prapañca in Nāgārjuna’s 
MMK as shown in the above section 1 as well as commentators’ interpretations on some 
of the verses of MMK as cited under section 2, it is most probable that, for Nāgārjuna, 
prapañca or the verb prapañcayati means a mental activity of conceptualization made 
in various sets of terms. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Candrakīrti in his 
PSP ad MMK XVIII.9b (see above 2-2) paraphrases prapañca by vāc “word, etc.”                           
                                     
 
Appendix: Usage of prapañca in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BBh), Chapter 4 titled 
Tattvārtha or “Meaning of Reality”: 
 
The author of BBh classified the meaning of vikalpa into eight types, i.e., “conception 
of own-nature” (svabhāva-vikalpa), “conception of particularity” (viśeṣa-vikalpa), 
“conception of a group” (piṇḍagrāha-vikalpa), “conception of ‘I’” (aham iti vikalpaḥ), 
“conception of ‘mine’” (mameti vikalpaḥ), “conception of the agreeable” 
(priya-vikalpa), “conception of the disagreeable” (apriya-vikalpa), and “conception of 
what is contrary to both these” (tadubhayaviparīta-vikalpa)”. 
 The relationship between vikalpa and prapañca is also referred to in relation to the 
first threefold conceptualization as follows:  
  
sa punar ayam aṣṭavidho vikalpaḥ katameṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ vastūnāṃ janako 
bhavati// yaś ca svabhāvavikalpo yaś ca viśeṣavikalpo yaś ca piṇḍagrāhavikalpa 
itīme trayo vikalpā vikalpaprapañcādhiṣṭhānaṃ vikalpaprapañcālambanaṃ 
vastu janayanti rūpādisaṃjñakam// yad vastv adhiṣṭhāya sa 
nāmasaṃjñābhilāpaparigṛhīto nāmasaṃjñābhilāpaparibhāvito vikalpaḥ 
prapañcayan tasminn eva vastuni vicaraty anekavidho bahunānāprakāraḥ// 
(Wogihara ed. 1930-1936: 107)  
“Further, which of the three bases (vastu) does the eightfold conception create? 
‘Conception of own-nature, conception of particularity, and conception of 
grasping a group’, this three-fold conception creates the base called ‘form’ and so 
on, i.e., the base which serves as the foundation of conceptual proliferation and 
the objective-basis of conceptual proliferation. With that base as its foundation, 
the proliferating conception of many kinds and various species ― enveloped in 
names, appellations, and verbal expression and saturated with names, 
appellations, and verbal expression ― spreads on the very base.”  






ABh: Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtty-Akutobhayā of Nāgārjuna, D No. 3829, P No. 5229. 
BP: Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti of Buddhapālita, D No. 3842, P No. 5242.  
BBh: Bodhisattvabhūmi. See Wogihara 1930-1936. 
D: Tibetan tripiṭaka, sDe dge edition. 
LVP: La Vallée Poussin. See PSP. 
MMK: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. See Ye 2011 and PSP. 
P: Tibetan tripiṭaka, Peking edition. 
PP: Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti of Bhāviveka, D No. 3853, P No. 5253. 
PSP: Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti-Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti. See La Vallée Poussin 
1903-1913. D No. 3860, P No. 5260. 
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